In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard introduced in [15] , with optimal contracting between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian contagion. We provide here a comprehensive mathematical formulation of the model and show using martingale arguments in the spirit of Sannikov [17] how the maximization problem with implicit constraints faced by investors can be reduced to a classic stochastic control problem. The approach has the advantage of avoiding the more general techniques based on forward-backward stochastic differential equations described in [6] and leads to a simple recursive system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. We provide a solution to our problem by a verification argument and give an explicit description of both the value function and the optimal contract. Finally, we study the limit case where the bank is no longer impatient.
Introduction
Following the seminal contributions of DeMarzo and Fishman [10] , [11] and Sannikov [17] , there has been a renewed interest in the mathematical treatment of continuous-time moral hazard models and their applications. In a typical moral hazard situation, a principal (who takes the initiative of the contract) is imperfectly informed about the action of an agent (who accepts or rejects the contract). The goal is to design a contract that maximizes the utility of the principal while that of the agent is held to a given level.
In its whole generality, the mathematical treatment of the problem can be cast as follows. Agency problems stemming from the agent's hidden action a limit the utility this agent can get from contracting with the principal. The optimal contract c specifies how these limitations should be strenghtened or slackened over time as a result of the agent's ongoing performance. We first have to solve the agent's problem for a given contract
where U A is the utility function of the agent. If we assume for simplicity that there exists a unique optimal action a(c) for any c, a point on the set of constrained Pareto optima can be found by solving the Principal's stochastic control problem
{E [U P (c, a(c))] + λE [U A (c, a(c))]} ,
where U P is the utility function of the principal and λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to some reservation utility of the agent.
Because of the almost limitless choices for c, it is generally assumed that the agent does not have complete control over the outcomes but instead continuously affects their distribution by choosing specific actions. This actually means that the agent affects the probability measure P a under which the above expectations are taken. This setting, which will be described more rigorously in the following section, corresponds to a weak formulation of the stochastic control problem.
As shown in [6] , a general theory can be used to solve these problems, by means of forward-backward stochastic differential equations. We show here how recursive, martingale representation-based techniques proposed by Sannikov [17] can be brought to bear on the issue to yield explicit solutions that are easier to derive. The model we consider, introduced by Pagès in [15] , is a contribution to the optimal design of securitization in the presence of banks' impaired incentives to monitor. In contrast with the main thread of the literature, which deals with Brownian motion risk, the focus is on large but infrequent risk, as in Biais et al [3] . An important difference is that credit risk arises in a non-stationary context as the result of imperfectly correlated defaults. Our aim is to provide a coherent mathematical framework for this problem and provide the rigorous foundations for the formal derivations adumbrated in [15] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we recall the model laid out in [15] , describe the contracts and give our main assumptions. In Section 3, we formally derive a candidate optimal contract by solving the HJB equation associated to the control problem. We then use a standard verification argument to show that the candidate solution is indeed the optimal contract. The paper concludes with a short Section devoted to a simple special case.
2 The model
Notations and preliminaries
We consider a model with universal risk neutrality in which time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0, ∞). Without loss of generality, the risk-free interest rate is taken to be 0. A bank has a claim to a pool of I unit loans indexed by i = 1, . . . , I which are ex ante identical. Each loan is a defaultable perpetuity yielding cash flow µ per unit time until it defaults. Once a loan defaults it gives no further payments. The infinite maturity and no recovery assumptions are made for tractability.
Denote by
1 {τ i ≤t} , the sum of individual loan default indicators, where τ i denotes the default time of loan i. The current size of the pool is I − N t . Since all loans are a priori identical, they can be reindexed in any order after defaults. The action of the bank consists in deciding at each time t whether it monitors any of the outstanding loans. These actions are summarized by the functions e i t defined by For 1 ≤ i ≤ I − N t , e i t = 1 if loan i is monitored at time t, and e i t = 0 otherwise. Non-monitoring renders a private benefit B > 0 per loan and per unit time to the bank. The opportunity cost of monitoring is thus proportional to the number of monitored loans.
The rate at which loan i defaults is controlled by the hazard rate α i t specifying its instantaneous probability of default conditional on history up to time t. Individual hazard rates are assumed to depend both on the monitoring choice of the bank and on the size of the pool. Specifically, we choose to model the hazard rate of a non-defaulted loan i at time t as α
where the parameters {α j } 1≤j≤I represent individual "baseline" risk under monitoring when the number of loans is j and ε is the proportional impact of shirking on default risk.
We define the shirking process k by
which represents the number of loans that the bank fails to monitor at time t. Then, according to (2.1), aggregate default intensity is given by
The bank can fund the pool internally at a cost r ≥ 0. Positive internal funding costs reflect bank's limited access to capital or deposits and may include any regulatory or agency costs associated with this source of financing. The bank can also raise funds from a competitive investor who values income streams at the prevailing riskless interest rate of zero. We assume that both the bank and investors observe the history of defaults and liquidations.
Description of the contracts
Contracts are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by investors to the bank and agreed upon at time 0. They determine how cash flows are shared and how loans are liquidated, conditionally on past defaults and liquidations. Without loss of generality, they specify that an investor receives cash flows from the pool and makes transfers to the bank. We denote by D = {D t } t≥0 the càdlàg, positive and increasing process describing cumulative transfers from the investors to the bank, such that
where τ is the liquidation time of the pool and where we assumed that D 0 = 0.
Remark 1.
In certain cases, it can be useful to let D have a jump at time 0. Indeed, for instance in the so called first-best (that is to say when the bank and the investors cooperate), it can be shown that the optimal solution to our problem is to make a lump transfer to the bank at time 0− and nothing afterwards. See Remark 3.4 for more details.
Let then H t := 1 {t≥τ } be the liquidation indicator of the whole pool. The contract specifies the probability θ t with which the pool is maintained given default (dN t = 1), so that at each point in time dH t = 0 with probability θ t , dN t with probability 1 − θ t .
With our notations,the hazard rates associated with the default and liquidation processes N t and H t are λ k t and (1 − θ t ) λ k t , respectively.
The contract also specifies when liquidation occurs. We assume that liquidations can only take the form of the stochastic liquidation of all loans following immediately default. The above properties translate into P τ ∈ τ 1 , ..., τ I = 1, and
We summarize the above details of the contracts, which are completely specified by the choice of (D, θ). Each infinitesimal time interval (t, t + dt) unfolds as follows:
• I − N t loans are performing at time t.
• The bank chooses to leave k t ≤ I − N t loans unmonitored and monitors the I − N t − k t others, enjoying private benefits k t B dt.
• The investor receives (I − N t ) µ dt from the cash flows generated by the pool and pays δ t dt ≥ 0 as fees to the bank.
• With probability λ k t dt defined by (2.2) there is a default (dN t = 1).
• Given default the pool is maintained (dH t = 0) with probability θ t or liquidated (dH t = 1) with probability 1 − θ t .
As recalled in the introduction, we assume that the bank's monitoring decision is not observable. This leads to a dynamic moral hazard problem, where the contract (δ, θ) uses observations on defaults to give the bank incentives to monitor. We assume that both the bank and investors can fully commit to such contracts.
Economic assumptions
In this section we give some Assumptions arising from economic considerations (see [15] for details). They are in force throughout the paper. Let α j denote the harmonic mean of α 1 , . . . , α j , i.e.,
The condition ensures that monitored loans are profitable viewed as of time 0.
The condition is related to the efficiency of monitoring and ensures that the benefits for a non-monitoring bank are not so high that shirking is socially preferable.
Assumption 2.3. Individual default risk is non-decreasing with past default
The condition introduces the possibility of correlated defaults through a contagion effect, as individual loans' intensity of default may increase with the arrival of new defaults.
Optimal contracting
Before going on, let us now describe the stochastic basis on which we are working. We will always place ourselves on a probability space (Ω, F, P) on which N is a Poisson process whith intensity λ 0 t (which is defined by (2.2)) and where P is the reference probability measure. We denote (F N t ) t≥0 ) the completed natural filtration of N and by (G t ) t≥0 the minimal filtration containing (F N t ) t≥0 ) and that makes the liquidation time of the pool τ a G-stopping time. We note that this filtration satisfies the usual hypotheses, and therefore we will always consider super or submartingales in their càdlàg version.
Incentive compatibility and limited liability
As recalled in the introduction, in order to make the problem tractable, we assume that the monitoring choices of the bank affect the distribution of the size of the pool. To formalize this, recall that, by definition, the shirking process k is G−predictable and bounded. Then, by Girsanov Theorem, we can define a probability measure P k equivalent to P such that
More precisely, we have from Brémaud [4] (Chapter VI, Theorem T3) that on G t
where Z k is the unique solution of the following SDE
Then, given a contract (D, θ) and a shirking process k, the bank's expected utility at t = 0 is given by
while that of the investor is
Following Sannikov [17] , we give now the definition of an incentive-compatible shirking process.
Definition 1.
A shirking decision k is incentive-compatible with respect to the contract (D, θ) if it maximizes (3.1).
Then, the problem faced by the investors is to design a contract (D, θ) and an incentivecompatible advice on k that maximize their expected discounted payoff, subject to a given reservation utility for the bank
This allows us to define a first set of admissible contracts for a given monitoring advice k Notice that we will put more restrictions on this set at the end of the section.
Using martingale arguments, we now elicit an equivalent condition for the incentive compatibility of k. Consider the bank's expected lifetime utility, conditional on G t
where u k t is the dynamic version of the bank's continuation utility defined as
Since we are working with the completed natural filtration of a Poisson process, and since U kwhere the dependence of h 1 and h 2 on k has been suppressed for notational convenience.
The introduction of the processes h 1 and h 2 provides a practical way of characterizing contracts for which a given k is incentive-compatible, as shown in the following proposition, inspired by Sannikov [17] .
Proposition 1. Given a contract (D, θ) and a shirking process k, the latter is incentivecompatible if and only if for all t ∈ [0, τ ] and for all i = 1...I, the following holds almostsurely,
Proof. Consider an arbitrary strategy k specifying the number of unmonitored loans at any point in time until liquidation. Let u k t denote the continuation utility in (3.6) resulting from the decision to forgo monitoring k loans at all times.
the lifetime utility of the bank viewed as of time t if it follows the strategy k before time t, and plans to switch to k afterwards.
We have for all t ∈ [0, τ ]
where we have used the promise-keeping equation (3.7) for u k . Therefore, the first term on the right-hand side
is the drift of U under P k . Note also that, by definition, h 1 and h 2 are integrable and therefore the martingale part of U is a true P k -martingale.
(i) Now assume that (3.8) does not hold on a set of positive measure, and choose k such that it maximizes the quantity
Then, the drift of U under P k is non-negative and strictly positive on a set of positive measure. Therefore U is a P k -submartingale. This implies the existence of a time t * > 0 such that
Therefore, if the agent follows this strategy k until the time t * and then switches to the strategy k, his utility is strictly greater than the utility obtained from following the strategy k all the time. This contradicts the fact that the strategy k is incentive-compatible.
(ii) With the same notations as above, assume that (3.8) holds for the strategy k. Then this means that U is a P k -supermartingale, regardless of the choice of strategy k. Moreover, since U is positive (because D is non-decreasing), it has a last element (see Problem 3.16 in [12] for instance). Then, we have by the optional sampling Theorem
where we used (3.9) and the fact that u k τ = 0 for the last inequality.
This means that the strategy k maximizes the expected utility of the agent and is therefore incentive-compatible. ✷
Under the assumption that monitoring is efficient, we now focus on contracts that actually deter the bank from shirking, i.e., contracts with respect to which k = 0 is incentivecompatible. In that particular case, the above Proposition can be simplified as follows.
Corollary 2. Given a contract (D, θ), k = 0 is incentive-compatible if and only if
Remark 2. Corollary 2 states that, given that the pool has i loans outstanding, in order to induce the bank to monitor all loans, the continuation payoff must drop in expectation by at least the quantity
following default.
In order to specify further our admissible strategies, we have to put some restrictions on h 1 and h 2 . First, we assume that the bank has limited liability. This means that the bank's continuation utility is bounded from below by b I−Nt up to liquidation, since otherwise the incentive-compatible (3.10) would be violated upon default. The limited liability constraint must also holds after a default if the pool is maintained in operation (dH t = 0), when the drop in utility is h 1 . This implies that the following condition holds
For the second condition, we assume that the bank forfeits any rights to cash flows once the pool is liquidated. The constraint u 0 τ = 0 implies in turn that at all times 12) since the drop in utility is h 1 + h 2 in that case.
The introduction of the processes h 1 and h 2 allows us to greatly simplify the set of admissible contracts by formulating the incentive compatibility requirement in terms of explicit conditions. Our set of admissible strategies is therefore 
(3.13)
Reduction to a stochastic control problem and HJB equation
Under condition (3.10), k = 0 is incentive-compatible. That being taken care of, solving for the optimal contract involves maximizing an investor's expected utility and is therefore a classical stochastic control problem. Let v j (u) denote the investor's value function, i.e., the maximum expected utility an investor can achieve given a pool of size j and a reservation utility for the bank u. Assume for now that the processes D are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (we will verify later that the property is satisfied at the optimum), that is to say
Then, we expect the investor's value function to solve the following system of HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equations with initial condition v 0 (u) = 0 14) where the C j are our admissible strategies sets defined by
Remark 3.1. We will see in the next section that our control problem is singular. Therefore the above HJB equation (3.14) is not exactly the correct one, and we will consider instead a variational inequality.
Given the constraints in the definition of C j , we reparametrize the problem in terms of the variable z := θ(u − h 1 ). This leads to the simpler system of HJB equations
15) where the constraints become
Our strategy now is to guess a candidate optimal contract by solving the above system of HJB equations, and to prove that the conjectured contract is indeed optimal by means of a verification argument. However, since j = 1 is a degenerate special case, it is convenient to treat monitoring with a single loan first before turning to the general case.
Single loan: Constant utility
We provide below a solution of the HJB equation which is compatible with our problem, in the sense that the initial conditions for v 1 are obtained from our formulation of the Principal/Agent problem.
Since there is only one loan, when it defaults the pool is automatically liquidated, which means that θ is always equal to 1. Since v 0 = 0 and b 0 = 0, optimizing first with respect to δ yields the following variational inequality for u > b 1 min − sup
Moreover, it appears that δ = 0 as long as v ′ 1 (u) + 1 > 0. Starting from this, finding the solution is an easy but lengthy exercise so we postpone the corresponding discussion to the Appendix. It nonetheless leads to the following Proposition Proposition 3.1. The function v 1 defined by
is a solution of (3.16).
Moreover if we extend linearly this function by continuity on [0,
Remark 3.2. In the case j = 1 the utility of the bank is always b 1 and the bank receives constant payments δ t = rb 1 + λ 1 b 1 until the loan defaults. We refer to Section 3.6 for the proof that the contract described above is indeed the optimal one when there is only one loan in the pool. We also refer the reader to the next section to understand the utility of extending the function on [0, b 1 ].
Formal derivation of a candidate optimal contract
In this section, we show how to formally obtain a recursive system of ODEs which should be satisfied by our value function.
Step (i) Optimizing first with respect to δ yields the following variational inequality for
where
We continue our guess of the value function assuming that all the functions v j are concave (a property which needs to be verified by our candidate). Then the first derivative of v j is decreasing. Let us also assume that there exists a level γ j > b j (a free boundary) such that
Then as long as u < γ j , v j satisfies the first equation in (3.17) . Therefore, equation (3.17) tells us that the bank receives cash from the investors only when its utility attains the level γ j (since δ = 0 is optimal before that). We also assume (and we will verify) that our candidate satisfy
This means that v j becomes linear above γ j , and that the variational inequality (3.17) takes the simpler form
Now in order to know which level γ j should be chosen, it is natural to require our solution to be maximal in the sense that for each u > b j
is maximal at the chosen value of γ j . Of course, it is not clear at all whether such a value exists. Nonetheless, we will prove that this heuristic approach can be proven rigorously, and that our maximality assumption has a clear economic meaning.
Step (ii) We next turn to the liquidation decision, one finds as first-order condition with respect to
Once again, if v j−1 is concave, the above inequality (3.18) is always verified. This means that the function θ −→ θv j−1 z θ , is non-decreasing, which implies that the optimal θ corresponds to its upper bound.
There are then two cases
(ii) u ∈ b j + b j−1 , γ j and θ = 1.
Step (iii) Finally consider the decision regarding z.
, then z has to be equal to u − b j . Then, in the probation interval θ = 1 and z is constrained in the range
We continue our guess of a candidate solution assuming that
a condition which needs to be verified by the resulting candidate.
Then, since v j−1 is supposed to be concave, we have for all
From this, we obtain that the function z −→ −zv ′ j + v j−1 (z) is non-decreasing, which in turn implies that the supremum over z is also attained at u − b j in the probation interval. Summarizing all the above formal calculations, we end up with the following system of ODEs, which should lead us to a solution of the HJB equation on the interval [b j , γ j ]
We next extend the value function v j to the interval [0, b j ] by setting 20) and to the interval (γ j , +∞) by
Then the above system of ODEs simplifies to
Recall that we need to verify that the solution obtained from (3.21) satisfies all the properties assumed in the derivation of our candidate.
Solving the HJB equation
We now provide conditions under which the heuristic derivation of the previous section indeed corresponds to a solution of the original system of HJB equations (3.15). Since we already solved the problem for j = 1, we assume here that j ≥ 2.
Let us define
and for x > 0 and 0 < β ≤ 1the functions
Remark 3.3. Then, it is easy to prove that the functions ψ β can be extended to continuous functions on R + which decrease from 1 to 1 2 and that for all x ≥ 0
We have the following results. 
where ∂v j (u) is the subdifferential of v j at u and verify
(ii) The λ j can be chosen recursively so that
In that case, the functions v j also verify
The proof is rather tedious and is relegated to the Appendix. Now since the functions v j constructed in Proposition 3.2 are globally concave, have a derivative which is greater than −1 for u < γ j and equal to −1 for u ≥ γ j and satisfy (3.26), we can apply the heuristic arguments of Section 3.4 to obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.2, the functions v j constructed in the same Proposition solve the HJB equation (3.14).
Proof. The only remaining property to prove is that for u ≥ γ j , we have
We compute
where we used the fact that v j−1 is concave, that u → v j−1 (u) + u is increasing and that
In particular, this shows that
Let us finally describe the contract (D, θ), first obtained in [15] , which can be deduced from the above results. Starting from a reservation utility x ≤ γ I for the bank, the following contract unfolds.
Contract 3.1. (i)
Given size j, the pool remains in operation (i.e. there is no liquidation) with one less unit at any time there is a default in the range b j + b j−1 , γ j .
(ii) The flow of fees paid to the bank given j is δ j t = λ j b j + rγ j as long as u t = γ j and no default occurs, where δ j is the density of D with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
(iii) Liquidation of the whole pool occurs with probability θ
To summarize, we have for j given and with the original notations of (3.14)
Remark 3.4. If the reservation utility for the bank x is greater than γ I then the contract should specify in addition that a transfer is immediately made to the bank so that its utility returns to the level γ I . This means that instead of considering transfers (D t ) t≥0 which are only absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, we have to add a Dirac mass at 0. Our proofs can then be easily adjusted to that case, therefore we will not treat it. Moreover, notice that the contract 3.1 is clearly in A 0 (x).
The verification theorem
In this subsection, we prove our main result.
Theorem 3.1. Let u 0 ≤ γ I be the reservation utility for the bank. Then, the optimal contract in A 0 (x) for the problem (3.3) is the contract 3.1.
We decompose the proof in two parts. First, we show that the bank can obtain a level of utility u 0 and the investors v I (u 0 ), for any u 0 ≥ b I , with this contract. The second part, reported in Proposition 3.3, shows that for any contract (D, θ) which makes the shirking decision k = 0 incentive-compatible, the utility the investors can obtain is bounded from above by v I (u 0 ), where u 0 is the utility obtained by the bank.
Proposition 3. Let the assumptions of Proposition 3.2 hold true. For any starting condition u 0 > b I , we define the process u t as the solution of the following SDE for j = 0, . . . , I − 1
Then, the contract defined by δ I−Nt (u t ), θ I−Nt (u t ) is incentive-compatible, has value u 0 for the bank and value v I (u 0 ) for the investors.
Proof. First, the drift and volatility in the SDE (3.29) are clearly Lipschitz. This guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution for all t. Moreover, it is also clear from the definitions of δ I−Nt , θ I−Nt , h 1,I−Nt and h 2,I−Nt that
Hence u t remains below γ I−Nt . Moreover, when N jumps, we have at the time of the jump
Therefore, we always have u t ≥ b I−Nt for t < τ . Hence, the process u is bounded.
Moreover, it is clear by construction that this contract makes the shirking decision k = 0 incentive-compatible. Indeed, we have after some calculations for all j
which is exactly (3.10).
Then, using the equation (3.7) for the continuation utility of the bank obtained with the contract (δ I−Nt (u t ), θ I−Nt (u t )), we obtain
Since h 1,Nt (u t ) and h 2,I−Nt (u t ) are bounded because u t is bounded and since h 1 t and h 2 t are in the space L 1 (P) by construction, we can take the conditionnal expectation above to obtain E t u 0 t+s − u t+s = e rs (u 0 t − u t ).
u 0 remains bounded, because the δ j are bounded for all j (recall (3.6)) and u is bounded, thus the left-hand side above must remain bounded. Since r > 0, letting s go to +∞ implies that u t = u 0 t , P − a.s. and in particular that the bank overall utility is
Let us now turn our attention to the investors. Define (3.30) where the v j are those defined in Proposition 3.2.
Let us place ourselves on the interval [τ j ∧ τ , τ j+1 ∧ τ ). We have shown before that u t remains above b I−j . But we know by construction that v I−j is continuous on [b I−j , +∞) and has a derivative which can be continuously extended on [b I−j , +∞). Hence we can apply the change of variable formula for locally bounded processes (see [8] , Chapter VI, Section 92) to obtain for all t ≥ 0
Let us decompose the jumps of v j . We have
which implies that
From this, we obtain
Using the fact that the v j solve the HJB equation 3.21, we deduce that
Hence, G is a bounded martingale until time τ (since δ is bounded by definition and u t and thus the v j (u t ) are also bounded) and we have, since u τ = 0
which is the desired result. ✷
We now show that v I (u 0 ) is an upper bound for the utility the investor can obtain from any contract which makes the shirking decision k = 0 incentive-compatible. Proof. We define as in the previous proof the quantity G t for an arbitrary contract (δ, θ).
By applying the change of variable formula and arguing exactly as before we can obtain that the drift of G is actually negative, using again (3.14). Indeed, we know that for any (D, θ, h 1 , h 2 ) ∈ A 0 (u 0 ), we have from Corollary 3.1 and its proof that for all j
and we know that
Hence, using again (3.32), we have 
Then, from (3.26), we know that for all j the function
Moreover, we have 
where λ := sup 1≤j≤I λ j , and where we used successively the fact that the derivative of the v j can be extended to a continuous function on [b j , γ j ] which is therefore bounded on that compact, then the fact that by the limited liability condition (3.11) we have h 1 t ≤ u t and finally that conditionally on the fact that there are j loans left in the pool, the drift of u t as given by (3.7) is
where we used the fact that h 1 , b j and λ j are positive. Hence, u t increases at a rate lower than r + 2λ.
Similarly, we have Taking expectations in (3.33), we therefore obtain
Then, we know that for all j the function u −→ u + v j (u) is increasing before γ j and is constant for u ≥ γ j . It is therefore bounded and we have
for some positive constant C. This quantity being integrable, we can apply the dominated convergence theorem in (3.34) and let t go to +∞ to obtain
which is the desired result. ✷ 4 What happens when r = 0?
In this section we treat our problem in the special case where the bank is as patient as the investors. We will see that in that case, the optimal contract leads to the first-best utility for the investors (but with fees paid continuously to the bank instead of a lump payment at time 0). Since most of the proofs follow exactly the same arguments as in the case r > 0, we will only sketch them. First, we give the analogue of Proposition 3.2 in that case. 
Proof. (i) When r = 0, the solution of (3.21) for a given γ ≥ b j is
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.2, it is easily proved that the choice of γ which leads to the maximum solution is
Reasoning by induction, we can then prove similarly that the functions v j verify all the desired properties. Moreover, since γ 1 = b 1 , we obtain that
(ii) We can prove that
By the concavity of v j−1 , this implies that for
Since (4.2) is clear when u > γ j , this proves (ii). ✷ Thanks to Proposition 4.1, we have a concave solution of the HJB equation, then using the same techniques as in the case r > 0, we can verify that the optimal contract is given by Hence, when the bank starts with a reservation utility equal to γ I (which is the only viable value for competitive investors, the contracts being on a take-it-or-leave-it basis), payments are never suspended since the penalty arising upon default brings the bank utility to the level γ I−1 . Besides, in that case it is never optimal to use the threat of stochastic liquidation.
In that case, we also have
Therefore, the social value of the contract is
which is exactly equal to E τ 0 µ(I − N t )dt , that is to say the social value which can be attained in the first-best. Hence, when the bank is no longer impatient, our contract leads to the same utility as in the first-best. This was to be expected, since there is no longer loss in utility due to the fact that the bank has to be penalized because of its impatience.
We also refer to [15] for heuristic results when other hypotheses of the model are relaxed.
Since this function has a derivative which is always positive, this means that in that case v ′ 1 + 1 > 0 and therefore δ is always equal to 0. Thus it follows that the investor's utility is equal to (see (3. 2) when k = 0)
contradicting the fact that λ 1 v 1 (b 1 ) > µ. Hence this case is not possible.
•
Then using (3.2) with k = 0, we obtain that δ = 0 (since we assumed that δ ≥ 0). Plugging this in (3.1), we get that the bank utility is equal to 0 even if the loan has not defaulted, which contradicts the fact that it should remain above its minimum level b 1 . Hence this case is not possible either.
Then at least on a small interval on the right of b 1 , we have v ′ 1 ≤ 0. Thus on this interval the variational inequality becomes
The solution of the first ODE in the system is given by
First, we consider the case r ≤ λ 1 . In that case the above function is concave for u > b 1 , its derivative decreases to −∞ and is therefore always negative. We will also verify next that we have v
This implies that the solution v 1 is equal to v 1 until its derivative reaches the value −1 at some uniquely defined point γ 1 . Thus, we have a solution on the interval [b 1 , γ 1 ]. In that case we know that δ = 0 for u < γ 1 . In order to obtain the value of δ when u = γ 1 , we return to the bank's utility dynamics given by (3.7)
Since h 1 = b 1 , h 2 = u − b 1 and θ = 1, we obtain
Hence, if u 0 0 < γ 1 then δ = 0 and thus the utility of the bank keeps on increasing until the default occurs or until the time t * for which u 0 t * = γ 1 . Then, δ t should be chosen so that u 0 t stays constant after that time t * , that is to say
Indeed, if δ t * < rγ 1 + λ 1 b 1 then u 0 keeps on increasing after t * and therefore δ t is equal to 0 except at t * , and thus the utility of the bank given by (3.1) is 0, which contradicts the fact that it should stay above b 1 . We obtain similarly a contradiction when δ t * > rγ 1 + λ 1 b 1 .
Now we want to calculate v 1 (b 1 ). First, in this case u 0 0 = b 1 , and we therefore have after some calculations
and thus by definition
Now recall that we have to verify that (A.1) holds. With the above value of v 1 (b 1 ), we obtain
Hence, it remains to verify that we indeed have that u 0 0 calculated with (3.1) is equal to b 1 . We have
Thus, u 0 0 = b 1 if and only if we actually have γ 1 = b 1 , which means that v 1 should be linear
We now need to verify that
We have Finally, we compute that • Initialization with j = 2
The solution of the ODE (3.21) for j = 2 and a given fixed value of γ ≥ b 2 can be easily calculated and is given by
Now since we have shown that v 1 is everywhere twice differentiable except at b 1 , we have for every γ = b 1 + b 2 and every
Thus, the above expression always has the sign of
, that is to say that it is positive for γ < b 1 + b 2 and negative for γ > b 1 + b 2 . Hence, we clearly have for all b 2 < u sup
which means that the maximal solution of (3.21) for j = 2 corresponds to the choice γ 2 = b 1 + b 2 , which also happens to correspond to the unique solution of
Then, after some calculations, we obtain that for all 
This implies that
Now recall Assumption 2.2, which implies that
• Heredity : j ≥ 3
Let us now suppose that the maximal solution of (3.21) v j−1 has been constructed for some j ≥ 3, that it is globally concave on [0, +∞), everywhere differentiable except at b j−1 , everywhere twice differentiable except at b j−1 and b j−1 + b j−2 , and that the corresponding γ j−1 ≥ b j−1 + b j−2 . Let us now construct the maximal solution corresponding to j. Exactly as in the case j = 2, the solution of the ODE (3.21) and a given fixed value of γ ≥ b j can be easily calculated and is given by
Note also that from (3.21) it is clear that v j is differentiable everywhere except at b j , and twice differentiable everywhere except at b j and b j + b j−1 .
Now since we assumed that v j−1 is everywhere differentiable except at b j−1 , we have for every γ = b j−1 + b j and every Thus, since v j−1 is concave and its derivative non-increasing, we can conclude as in the case j = 2 that the maximal solution is uniquely determined by the choice γ j which corresponds to the solution of r λ j − 1 ∈ ∂v j−1 (γ j − b j ).
More precisely, using (3.22), we have only two cases. Either, Note also that the property (3.26) clearly holds for v j when u > γ j . Indeed, we have v ′ j = −1 and we know that the derivative of v j−1 is always greater than −1.
Let us now show the rest of the result by induction. Since (3.26) is true for j = 2, let us fix a j ≥ 3 and assume that 
